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Abstract
This paper investigates the formation, stability and success of an agreement between
the coastal states on the management of the blue whiting ﬁshery under two opposing
assumption about the distribution of the stock, based on diﬀerent climate change scenarios
for the Northeast Atlantic Ocean as a result of global warming. Two climate change
scenarios for the Northeast Atlantic Ocean are analysed. In one scenario, increased ocean
temperature expands the blue whiting's migration pattern and its area of distribution,
making Russia a coastal state with regard to the blue whiting stock in addition to the
countries already recognized as such. In this scenario, the stability of the coastal state
coalition does not change relative to the Status Quo, i.e., Ekerhovd (2008), although the
payoﬀ to the coalition increases when Russia enters. The second scenario looks at the
consequences of a colder climate on the distribution of the blue whiting stock. The stock
no longer occupies Russian EEZs and Russia is not regarded as a coastal state by the
other countries. In this scenario, the stability of the coastal state coalition is severely
weakened such that the formation of a coastal state coalition is an even more unlikely
outcome compared to Ekerhovd (2008).
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climate change, blue whiting.
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1 Introduction
The ecosystem of the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea is one of the world's richest,
purest, and most productive marine areas, and where the climate, both in the sea and
the atmosphere, is expected to change1 in response to global warming (Stenevik and
Sundby, 2007). Although the prevailing view seems to be that these waters will become
warmer over the next 50-70 years, to the extent that the Arctic Ocean could become
ice-free during the summer, there is also the possibility that the Gulf Stream and the
termohaline circulation could be weakened, leading to a colder climate in northwestern
Europe, despite global warming (Anon., 2004).
Higher ocean temperatures could lead to higher plankton production and, because of
ice melting, even production in previously inaccessible areas. Changes in prey availability
will inﬂuence the distribution of straddling ﬁsh stocks2 which seasonally migrate into such
areas. Furthermore, higher abundance of plankton could lead to an increased production
of plankton feeding ﬁsh, and as plankton feeding ﬁsh typically serve as important prey
for other ﬁshes, this could spill over on the higher trophic levels as well. However, the
predator-prey relationship makes it diﬃcult to predict how exactly these changes will
aﬀect a speciﬁc species, and is further complicated by the fact that individuals of the
same species may be at diﬀerent trophic levels depending on the current stage of their life
cycle. Younger and smaller ﬁsh, to a large extent, feed on plankton, but as they become
older and bigger they prefer larger organisms as prey; and even smaller individuals of
their own species.
The blue whiting stock3 (Micromesistius Poutassou Risso) in the Northeast Atlantic
1Climate change is usually linked to changes in temperature, but also other climate parameters such
as salinity, ocean currents, ice conditions, light (which depends, among other things, on the cloud cover
and season), and turbulence (which changes with the wind conditions) aﬀects the ecosystem (Anon.,
2008).
2Straddling ﬁsh stocks are a special category of internationally shared ﬁshery resources that straddle
exclusive economic zones (EZZ) where states have special rights over the exploration and use of marine
resources, and adjacent high seas. These species, usually targeted by both coastal states and distant
water ﬁshing nations, became increasingly disputed after the establishment of exclusive economic zones
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003).
3The northern stock of blue whiting migrates between the spawning grounds west of the British Isles
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migrates through the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the European Union (EU), the
Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway, considered as the coastal states with respect to the
stock, and in the international waters beyond the EEZs, where it can be harvested by
vessels from any country, not just the coastal states. Besides the coastal states, Russia
is an important player in the blue whiting ﬁshery. In 2005, the coastal states consisting
of the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway signed an agreement starting in 2006
which includes a long term management strategy that implies annual reductions in the
landings until the management goals are reached. Russia will be accommodated by
transfers from some of the coastal states and additional catches in the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commissions' (NEAFC)4 regulatory areas, i.e., the international waters in the
Northeast Atlantic (Ekerhovd, 2008).
The blue whiting stock is expected to change its distribution, spawning areas and
migration pattern due to climate change. Recently, in years with a relatively warm ocean
climate, juvenile blue whiting has appeared in great abundance in the southwesterly parts
of the Barents Sea. Currently, the blue whiting stock's main spawning area is west of the
British Isles, but some spawning takes place along the coast of Norway as well as in the
Norwegian fjords. The northerly distribution of blue whiting might also be an eﬀect of
stock abundance caused by the successful recruitment in the 1996-2004 period. The poor
recruitment after this period, along with a high ﬁshing mortality, has led to considerable
reduction in the blue whiting abundance in the Barents Sea in 2007, even though the
temperature was well above its long term mean. This means that the distribution of the
and the feeding areas in the Norwegian Sea, cf. Figure (1). After the spawning period in March-May,
the majority of the post-spawning ﬁsh pass the Faroe Islands either on the western side through the
Faroe Bank Channel or on the eastern side through the Faroe-Shetland Channel. The stock size of the
blue whiting has ﬂuctuated substantially during the last three decades, and is currently estimated to be
high, at approximately four million tonnes (Bailey, 1982; ICES, 2007). For more details about the blue
whiting ﬁshery, see Ekerhovd (2008).
4The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC, is a regional ﬁsheries management
organization, with membership open to all parties with real interests in the ﬁsh stocks within the areas
covered by the convention. NEAFC is intended to serve as a forum for consultation, the exchange of
information on ﬁsh stocks and the management of these, and advise on the ﬁsheries in the high sea areas
mentioned in the convention on which the commission is based. Since most of the ﬁsheries take place
within the jurisdiction of the coastal states, NEAFC has no real management responsibilities beyond the
fraction of the ﬁsh stocks located within the high seas areas covered by the convention (Bjørndal, 2008).
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species is also connected with the abundance of the stock.
This paper investigates the formation, stability and success of an agreement between
the coastal states on the management of the blue whiting ﬁshery under two opposing
assumptions about the distribution of the stock, based on diﬀerent climate change
scenarios for the Northeast Atlantic Ocean as a result of global warming. Because
the EEZs are ﬁxed upon the map, an expansion of the blue whiting stock could aﬀect
the distribution of the stock between the EEZs of the coastal states and international
waters. These changes could put the coastal state agreement under strain. Some of the
coastal states might be discontented with their share of the stock, based on an earlier
distribution of the stock, so that they ﬁnd themselves better oﬀ leaving the coalition of
coastal states and harvesting the stock taking the others' actions as given. The expansion
of the distribution area could make Russia a coastal state, demanding the same status
and same rights as the original coastal state coalition members.
Two climate change scenarios for the Northeast Atlantic Ocean are analysed. In one
scenario, increased ocean temperature expands the blue whiting's migration pattern and
its area of distribution, making Russia a coastal state with regard to the blue whiting
stock in addition to the countries already recognized as such. In this scenario, the stability
of the coastal state coalition does not change relative to the Status Quo, i.e., Ekerhovd
(2008), although the payoﬀ to the coalition increases when Russia enters. The second
scenario looks at the consequences of a colder climate on the distribution of the blue
whiting stock. The stock no longer occupies Russian EEZs and Russia is not regarded as
a coastal state by the other countries. In this scenario, the stability of the coastal state
coalition is severely weakened such that the formation of a coastal state coalition is an
even more unlikely outcome compared to Ekerhovd (2008).
The analysis is conducted, drawing on the model described in Ekerhovd (2008), by
changing the quarterly zonal attachment shares of the blue whiting stock in accordance
with the climate change scenarios outlined in the previous paragraph.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the climate change scenarios
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and how we imagine this will aﬀect the distribution of the blue whiting stock. In Section
3 we presents results of the blue whiting game by applying the distributions derived in
the previous section. Finally, Section 4 sums up the results and concludes.
2 Climate Change Scenarios
In this section we outline two alternative scenarios regarding climate change in the
Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. An increased inﬂow of Atlantic water into these
areas causing the ocean temperatures to rise is described ﬁrst. Then the opposite outcome
of global warming on the ocean temperatures in the Northeast Atlantic, with a reduced
inﬂow of Atlantic water to the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, is outlined. Finally,
we describe how we imagine the blue whiting stock will be distributed geographically
under the respective climatic regimes. These distributions will later be used when we
simulate the coalition payoﬀs under the diﬀerent climate change scenarios.
The two climate change scenarios are linked to ﬂuctuations in the North Atlantic
Oscillation index. The North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) is a large scale oscillatory
ﬂuctuation of atmospheric mass between the Icelandic low-pressure centre and the Azores'
high-pressure ridge that normally extends from continental Europe to the Azores. It
is manifested by a weakening of the intensity in one of the centres of action and
a simultaneous strengthening in the other. The NAO index is determined from the
diﬀerence in atmospheric sea level pressure between the Azores high and the Iceland low,
for example between Lisbon, Portugal, and Stykkisholmur, Iceland. It is seen most clearly
from December to March, when the atmospheric circulation is most intense. Variability in
the NAO is associated with the strength of the westerly winds across the North Atlantic
into the Nordic Seas. A high NAO winter index is associated with the path of the
low pressures along a pressure trough that extends from the Iceland low, across the
Norwegian and Barents Seas, to the margins of Siberia (Blindheim, 2004). A high NAO
index is associated with high inﬂow of Atlantic water, while the opposite is true for a low
4
 Figure 1: Map showing the Northeast Atlantic and adjacent waters (Bailey, 1982).
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NAO index (Stenevik and Sundby, 2007; Hátún et al., 2007).
2.1 Scenario 1. High NAO, high inﬂow of Atlantic water and
higher temperatures in the Barents Sea
The blue whiting is one of the species that will probably expand its distribution in a
more northerly direction in response to a warmer ocean climate. Recently, in years with
relatively warm ocean climate, juvenile blue whiting has appeared in great abundance in
the south-western part of the Barents Sea. The blue whiting stock's main spawning area
is currently west of the British Isles, but some spawning activity occurs oﬀ the coast of
Norway as well as in the Norwegian fjords. With spawning occurring in the Norwegian
Sea and adolescent blue whiting growing up in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea,
the blue whiting would be able to take advantage of the production of plankton in the
Greenland Sea in a warmer ocean climate (Anon., 2008).
A more northerly distribution of blue whiting may also be caused by the increased
stock abundance due to an exceptionally high recruitment to the stock during the 1996-
2004 period. The poor recruitment in the following years, combined with a high ﬁshing
pressure, led to a signiﬁcant reduction in the abundance of blue whiting in the Barents Sea
in 2007, even though the temperature was well above the long term mean. This indicates
that the distribution of ﬁsh species also is linked to the over-all stock abundance (Anon.,
2008).
This scenario is associated with a high NAO index, and a high inﬂow of Atlantic water
into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea accompanied by an increase in temperature
(Stenevik and Sundby, 2007). Following an increase in inﬂow of Atlantic water and a
resulting increase in temperature, the character of the ecosystems in Norwegian waters
will most likely change. The borders between the temperate ecosystem in the Atlantic
and the boreal ecosystems of the Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea and the Arctic areas may
move northwards, resulting in substantial changes to the ﬁsh communities in the diﬀerent
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areas.
2.2 Scenario 2. Low NAO, less inﬂow of Atlantic water
With a reduced NAO index, on the other hand, the inﬂow of Atlantic water will
become weaker but broader (Stenevik and Sundby, 2007). This could lead to increased
temperature in the western part of the Norwegian Sea and changes in the migration and
spawning distribution of the blue whiting.
During a phase of negative NAO index, the inﬂow of Atlantic water to the Barents
Sea is reduced. This leads to a colder climate, particularly in the southern part of the
Barents Sea. Also, the abundance of the copepode Calanus ﬁnmarchicus, an important
zooplankton prey for blue whiting, decreases due to less inﬂow.
After spawning, blue whiting migrate from the spawning grounds west of the British
Isles, past the Faroe Islands and into the feeding areas in the Norwegian Sea during the
spring months March to early June. The changeable migratory route through Faroese
waters, as inferred from ﬁsheries statistics, is found to be closely linked to the hydrography
along the Rockall Bank, as simulated by an ocean circulation model (Hátún et al., 2007).
Furthermore, Hátún et al. (2007) suggests a variable spawning intensity around the bank
as the causal mechanism for this link. The observed variability is primarily governed by
the strength and extent of the subpolar gyre5 (Hátún et al., 2005). The blue whiting is
especially sensitive to both temperature and salinity during the spawning period and will
5Wind stress induces a circulation pattern that is similar for each ocean. In each case, the wind-driven
circulation is divided into large gyres that stretch across the entire ocean: subtropical gyres extend from
the equatorial current system to the maximum westerlies in a wind ﬁeld near 50◦ latitude, and subpolar
gyres extend poleward of the maximum westerlies. The subpolar gyres are cyclonic circulation features.
In the North Atlantic the subpolar gyre consists of the North Atlantic Current on the equatorward side
and the Norwegian Current that carries relatively warm water northward along the coast of Norway.
The heat released from the Norwegian Current into the atmosphere maintains a moderate climate in
northern Europe. Along the east coast of Greenland is the southward-ﬂowing cold East Greenland
Current. It loops around the southern tip of Greenland and continues ﬂowing into the Labrador Sea.
The southward ﬂow that continues oﬀ the coast of Canada is called the Labrador Current. This current
separates for the most part from the coast near Newfoundland to complete the subpolar gyre of the
North Atlantic. Some of the cold water of the Labrador Current, however, extends farther south.
Source: ocean. Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 07 Jul. 2008
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424285/ocean>.
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only spawn in waters warmer than 8-9◦ C and salinities in excess of 35.2-3. The average
hydrography in the region east of the Rockall Bank is near these threshold values, although
the variations are considerable.
After the spawning period in March - May, the majority of the post-spawning ﬁsh
pass the Faroe Islands either on the western side through the Faroe Bank Channel or on
the eastern side through the Faroe-Shetland Channel, cf. Figure (1).
When the ﬁshery takes place on the western slope of the Faroe Plateau the ﬁshable
concentrations are conﬁned to a narrow and often dense band along the shelf edge which
also is associated with a sharp hydrographic front. When, on the other hand, the ﬁshery
takes place in the Faroe-Shetland Channel the shoals are more dispersed and less ﬁshable.
High values of the gyre index are associated with cold and fresh conditions in the
Northeast Atlantic. This seems to coincide with years when the stock has an easterly
distribution, while low gyre index values, associated with warm and saline conditions,
seem to coincide with years when the stock has a western distribution.
The NAO index is directly related to the westerlies through the sea level pressure
diﬀerence between Iceland and the Azores-Gibraltar region. This index showed record
high values during the early 1990s. This resulted in a relatively fresh, strong and inﬂated
subpolar gyre, and the subarctic front was moved far eastwards into the Northeast
Atlantic. The spawning/migration waters between Rockall Bank and the Faroe Islands
were fresh and cold during these years, and the blue whiting stock was small.
An extreme reversal in the NAO index in the winter 1995-1996 was followed by
a dramatic decline in the subpolar gyre, a westward shift in the subarctic front, a
temperature and salinity increase in the spawning/migration region, replacement in the
plankton community6, a threefold increase in the blue whiting spawning stock biomass,
and a clear shift from years with a persistent easterly migration route to a period of a
6Prior to 1996, an inverse relationship between the abundance of Calanus ﬁnmarchicus and NAO
winter index appeared to exist. However, with the change to the strongly negative NAO index in 1996,
when the regression predicted high abundance of Calanus, there was in fact a record low abundance.
Low abundance continued for the rest of the 1990s (Skjoldal and Sætre, 2004).
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Figure 2: The high seas of the NEAFC Regulatory Area (dark shaded) inside the NEAFC
Convention Area (shaded) in the Northeast Atlantic http://www.neafc.org/about/ra.htm
persistent western migration.
Under a climate regime with a reduction in the NAO index and less inﬂow of Atlantic
water, the distribution of the blue whiting stock will move in a south-western direction,
with no blue whiting in Russia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and no spawning activity
in Norwegian waters. However, with an increased density of blue whiting on the banks
between Iceland and the Faroe Island, spawning activity in Icelandic waters is possible.
2.3 Distribution of the Blue Whiting Stock
In the following, we will illustrate the above scenarios by suggesting a quarterly area
distribution for each of them that is consistent with the implied spawning and migration
patterns.
The year is divided into quarters, y, whereas i denotes the respective EEZs in the
case of the EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway and Russia, and NEAFC regulatory area
(RA)7 meaning international waters, shown in Figure (2). Thus, Si,y denotes the shares
7There are three regulatory areas within the NEAFC convention area. In the the Northeast, and of
minor relevance in the blue whiting context, the `Loop Hole', a 67,100 km2 area in the Barents Sea,
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of the blue whiting stock available for harvest in the diﬀerent waters throughout the year.
Typically, each scenario is not characterized by a single combination of shares. Several
combinations are possible and each scenario is deﬁned by a sub-group of all possible
combinations. Therefore, three alternative combinations of shares are presented for each
scenario.
First, Table (1) shows the shares, Si,y, in the case where there is an increase in the
amount of Atlantic water entering the Norwegian Sea, causing an increase in sea water
temperature and salinity in both the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. This means
that the habitat of the blue whiting expands north-eastward into the Barents Sea, such
that Russia becomes a coastal state, and the blue whiting spawns in Norwegian waters
in addition to EU and Faroese waters. At times when the blue whiting is not present
in a coastal state's EEZ, the ﬁshermen from that country can only ﬁsh blue whiting in
international waters if possible8. Otherwise, they can harvest in their home waters as
well as on the high seas.
The year begins with blue whiting present in all areas except for Russia's EEZ.
Spawning takes place in the second quarter, and the stock is equally divided between
EU, Faroese and Norwegian EEZs (Scenario 1a, and 1b), or alternatively between EU,
Faroese, Icelandic and Norwegian EEZs (Scenario 1c). After spawning, the stock migrates
out into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, abandoning EU waters altogether, with
either 1/3 of the stock in international waters and 1/3 in the Norwegian EEZ (Scenario
1a) or, as in Scenario 1b, with 1/4 of the stock in international waters and 1/4 in the
Norwegian EEZ; the rest is equally divided between the EEZs of Iceland, the Faroe Islands
and Russia in the third and fourth quarters. In Scenario 1c, the stock is equally divided
surrounded by the EEZs of Norway and Russia, and the ﬁshery protection zone around the Svalbard
archipelago (Spitzbergen); in the Norwegian Sea, the 321,700 km2 area, known as the `Banana Hole',
surrounded by the EEZs of Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, the ﬁshery zone around
Jan Mayen, an island under Norwegian sovereignty, and the ﬁshery protection zone around Svalbard;
and ﬁnally, the area in the Northeast Atlantic with the Reykjanes Ridge in the centre, c.f Figure (2),
which is limited to the north by the EEZs of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands, and to the east
by the EEZ of the EU (Bjørndal, 2008).
8This is a simpliﬁcation that we make. In reality, bilateral agreements exist allowing foreign vessels
access to the stock in national waters.
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Table 1: Scenario 1: Quarterly zonal attachment of the blue whiting stock Si,y
Scenario 1a
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/3 0 1/3 1/3
European Community 1/3 1/3 0 0
Faroe Islands 1/9 1/3 1/9 1/9
Iceland 1/9 0 1/9 1/9
Norway 1/9 1/3 1/3 1/3
Russian Federation 0 0 1/9 1/9
Scenario 1b
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
European Community 1/8 1/3 0 0
Faroe Islands 1/8 1/3 1/6 1/6
Iceland 1/8 0 1/6 1/6
Norway 1/8 1/3 1/4 1/4
Russian Federation 0 0 1/6 1/6
Scenario 1c
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/4 0 1/5 1/5
European Community 1/4 1/4 0 0
Faroe Islands 1/6 1/4 1/5 1/5
Iceland 1/6 1/4 1/5 1/5
Norway 1/6 1/4 1/5 1/5
Russian Federation 0 0 1/5 1/5
11
between the NEAFC regulatory area and the EEZs of the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway,
and Russia in the third and fourth quarters.
As to Scenario 2, Table (2) shows the quarterly distribution of the blue whiting stock
in national and international waters when the penetration of Atlantic water into the
Norwegian/Barents Seas is reduced because of less wind-induced ocean currents. This
means colder sea water with reduced salinity, in spite of global warming, and a more
western distribution of the blue whiting stock in the Norwegian Sea. Spawning takes
place in the waters between Iceland and the Faroe Islands as well as in EU waters. The
western distribution reduces the availability of the blue whiting in international waters
and Norwegian waters, and Russia is no longer regarded as a coastal state.
During the ﬁrst quarter the stock is equally divided between the North East Atlantic
Fisheries (NEAFC) regulatory area in Northeast Atlantic and EU waters west of the
British Isles and Ireland. Spawning takes place in the second quarter, in EU waters (1/2)
and in national waters between Iceland and the Faroe Islands (1/4 each). In Scenario 2c,
we allow for spawning in the Norwegian EEZ, as well as in the EEZs of the EU, the Faroe
Islands and Iceland, and the stock is equally divided between the zones. During summer
and autumn the blue whiting migrates into the Norwegian Sea, but because of colder and
fresher water in the eastern part, along the coast of Norway, it now has a more western
distribution, with highest densities in the EEZs of Iceland and the Faroe Islands. This
means that there will be no blue whiting in Russia's EEZ, only in the NEAFC regulatory
area in the Norwegian Sea and the EEZs of the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway. For
the respective scenarios and shares we refer to Table (2).
3 The Coalition Game of the Blue Whiting Fishery
In this section, we calculate the net present values for the coalition game setting. We do
not, however, calculate the net present values for every possible coalition structure of the
game but restrict our analysis to calculate the payoﬀs of the coastal state coalition and
12
Table 2: Scenario 2: Quarterly zonal attachment of the blue whiting stock Si,y
Scenario 2a
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/6 1/6
European Community 1/2 1/2 0 0
Faroe Islands 0 1/4 1/3 1/3
Iceland 0 1/4 1/3 1/3
Norway 0 0 1/6 1/6
Russian Federation 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2b
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
European Community 1/2 1/2 0 0
Faroe Islands 0 1/4 9/32 9/32
Iceland 0 1/4 9/32 9/32
Norway 0 0 3/16 3/16
Russian Federation 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2c
i\y First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
European Community 1/2 1/4 0 0
Faroe Islands 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
Iceland 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
Norway 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
Russian Federation 0 0 0 0
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the payoﬀs accruing to its members from unilateral free-rider behaviour. In addition, we
calculate the individual payoﬀ to players when all act noncooperatively.
For the single-player coalitions (singletons), we assume that the countries play a
noncooperative game. This means that when a country does not belong to any coalition,
it does not cooperate, and all it can do is maximize its own proﬁt, taking into account
the strategies of the other players.
For a coalition consisting of three or four countries, the countries outside the coalition
will play noncooperatively against the coalition members. Thus, the members of the
coalition will try to do their best, taking into account the actions of the outside countries
and vice versa.
Under full cooperation, the value of the grand coalition where all players are
cooperating, is given by maximizing the sum of net revenues of the countries.
To simulate the possible outcomes of this ﬁshery under the climatic scenarios outlined
above, an age structured bioeconomic model was used9. Assume that all the countries
participating in the blue whiting ﬁshery are represented in the game as the EU (European
Union), FO (Faroe Islands), IS (Iceland), NO (Norway), and RU (Russian Federation).
Also consider the management of this ﬁshery to be the constant eﬀort strategy10 that
maximizes the net present value of proﬁts (NPV) over a 35-year period. A general
description of the model is presented in the Appendix.
Let us continue with the coalition analysis of the climate change scenarios outlined
above. First, an increase in inﬂow of Atlantic water, cf. Scenario 1 Table (1), in contrast
to Ekerhovd (2008) and the second scenario, cf. Table (2), expands the distribution of
the blue whiting eastward into the Barents Sea such that Russia will become a coastal
state, and the grand coalition (sole-owner) and the coastal state coalition is identical. The
resulting payoﬀs to the various coalition structures are shown in Table (3). The ﬁrst result
9This model is presented in Ekerhovd (2008)
10A constant eﬀort strategy (although it may seem very simplistic) corresponds to a variable catch
strategy, which depends positively on the stock level. This type of strategy is especially relevant when
there are signiﬁcant costs of eﬀort adjustment, as in the presence of high costs or diﬃculties in transferring
ﬁshing eﬀort between diﬀerent ﬁsheries (Pintassilgo, 2003).
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is the payoﬀ to a coalition consisting of all the coastal states. Next, Table (3) presents
the payoﬀ to the individual nations from unilaterally leaving the grand coalition, starting
with Russia, if they act as singletons (free-riding) while the other nations remain in a
coalition. The latter's payoﬀs are listed under CS in the tables. We see that, although
the grand coalition's payoﬀ of NOK 7,871 million (m) is large enough to compensate
one member its free-riding payoﬀ while the rest remain in the coalition, and leave the
remaining countries as least as well oﬀ (subtract the payoﬀs under CS in Table (3) from
7,871 m, and compare the results with each coastal state's free-rider payoﬀs), the sum
of all the free-riding payoﬀs exceeds the payoﬀ of the grand coalition; NOK 12,937 m,
19,328 m, and 16,214 m for the scenarios 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively, compared to NOK
7,871 m. Therefore, in a strict sense, the grand coalition cannot be said to be a stable
coalition structure.
Let us now consider the stability of the coastal state coalition if unilateral deviations
is not an option, but any deviation from the coastal state agreement breaks down any
coalition and all the players revert to noncooperative behaviour. As is shown in Table
(3), there is no unique solution when all act as singletons. There are multiple strategy
combinations that can be considered best response for all players. Table (3) presents
average payoﬀs to each player along with maximum and minimum payoﬀs. The maximum
solutions are probably not feasible for all players simultaneously and the minimum is zero
for all players. However, if the average (mean) payoﬀs can be taken as an example of what
the players can expect to gain by acting noncooperatively, the sum of all the singleton
payoﬀs is less than the payoﬀ to the grand coalition. The sum of the payoﬀs of the
coastal states when they all act noncooperatively, NOK 4,367 m, 5,205 m, and 4,922 m
for the scenarios 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively, are less than NOK 7,871 m; the payoﬀ of
the grand coalition. Thus, the coastal state agreement can be considered stable and the
Nash equilibrium of the coalition game.
Table (4) shows the coalition payoﬀs of the second climate change scenario, i.e, the
stock is distributed according to the shares shown in Table (2), where the inﬂow of
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Table 3: Scenario 1: Blue Whiting Game - Payoﬀs
Scenario 1a
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 7074 3852 3222
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 7170 3708 3462
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 7102 3801 3302
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 7481 6079 1402
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 7417 5868 1549
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 4367 1024 903 775 882 784
MAX 2178 2072 1932 2066 1743
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 1b
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 7792 1935 5857
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 6901 3565 3337
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 6887 3644 3243
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 6934 3507 3427
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 6977 3513 3464
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 5205 1095 1077 1046 1039 947
MAX 2590 2607 2482 2847 2556
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 1c
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6774 3810 2964
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 6903 3621 3282
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 6903 3621 3282
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 6903 3621 3282
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 6996 3592 3404
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 4922 1068 1019 1019 1019 797
MAX 2431 2335 2335 2335 2056
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
†Values of NPV in million Norwegian kroner (NOK).
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Table 4: Scenario 2: Blue Whiting Game - Payoﬀs
Scenario 2a
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6934 3635 3299
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 5640 2267 1712 1662
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 5771 2252 1814 1704
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 5771 2252 1814 1704
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 5982 2017 2283 1682
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 4886 4055∗ 1228 961 961 905 831
MAX 2546 2223 2223 1971 1820
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2b
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6972 3699 3273
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 6392 2947 2582 864
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 6535 3115 2744 676
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 6535 3115 2744 676
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 6684 2808 3198 678
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 5124 4121∗ 1193 1003 1003 922 1003
MAX 2955 2509 2509 2233 2298
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2c
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value†
Coalition Structure Total CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6972 3699 3273
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 5806 2017 2265 1524
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 5806 2017 2265 1524
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 5806 2017 2265 1524
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 6420 2715 2841 865
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)
MEAN 5128 4120∗ 1056 1021 1021 1021 1008
MAX 2494 2435 2435 2435 2357
MIN 0 0 0 0 0
†Values of NPV in million Norwegian kroner (NOK).
∗The sum of payoﬀs from the coastal states acting as singletons.
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Atlantic water to the Norwegian Sea is reduced, resulting in a more western distribution
of the blue whiting stock. The spawning takes place in the EEZs of the EU, the Faroe
Island and Iceland; in Scenario 2c in Norway's EEZ as well, and there is no blue whiting in
Russia's EEZ. Hence, Russia is not a partner in the blue whiting agreement and therefore
always operates as a free rider. We see that the beneﬁts provided in terms of payoﬀ when
all the coastal states cooperate in a coalition, NOK 3,635 m and 3,699 m with respect to
Scenario 2a, and Scenario 2b and 2c, are insuﬃcient to compensate the free-riders with
their payoﬀs acting as singletons while the others continue as a smaller coalition. Nor is
the payoﬀ earned by the coastal state coalition larger than the sum of the payoﬀs when
all players act noncooperatively. The sums of the payoﬀs of the coastal states when all
players act noncooperatively, NOK 4,055 m, 4,121 m, and 4,120 m for the scenarios 2a,
2b, and 2c, respectively, are higher than NOK 3,635 m and 3,699 m; the payoﬀs to the
coastal state coalition for the scenarios 2a, and 2b and 2c, respectively. Thus, in the
scenario where global warming leads to a colder climate in Northern Europe and the blue
whiting has a more western distribution than at present, a coastal state coalition cannot
be stable under any circumstances, not even if the threat points are the noncooperative
payoﬀs.
It is important to note that in the presence of non-unique equilibrium this result was
based on the average of all the diﬀerent possible solutions. If we had chosen one of the
possible solutions, the cooperative solution could possibly be a better solution than the
sum of the singletons payoﬀs of the coastal states. However, due to the lack of a better
equilibrium selection criteria, in the presence of multiple equilibria we decided use the
average of the equilibria payoﬀs as a representation of the payoﬀs the players could expect
in the coalition structure where non-uniqueness occur.
In Scenario 1, with a high NAO index, increased ocean temperatures and salinity
in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, we assumed that the blue whiting migrated
into Russian waters and that Russia achieved the status of being a coastal state with
regard to the management of this stock. The change in status from being regarded as
18
a distant water ﬁshing nation by the original coastal states to be accepted and included
as a coastal state in the management of a straddling ﬁsh stock when the stock for some
reason changes its migration pattern and distribution is not necessarily a straight forward
process. It might take years before the new status is generally accepted by the others,
as the shift in the distribution can be a gradual process with a considerable amount of
short term variation, meaning that there may be considerable doubt as to whether a shift
in distribution is only a temporary change or if the ﬁsh stock actually has changed its
migration pattern and area of distribution permanently. During the period of transition,
the underlying uncertainty might put an established agreement on the management of
the stock among the original coastal states at risk, as the emerging coastal state tries to
prove its claim to the stock by severely increasing its ﬁshing eﬀort and thus its catches
in order to establish rights to the ﬁshery and gain acceptance for their new status. The
original coastal states' members might try to limit the prospective coastal state's proﬁt
by increasing their ﬁshing eﬀorts too. If this transient period lasts for a long time and
the noncooperative behaviour is allowed to continue, it might threaten the ﬁshery, as the
stock cannot sustain a too high ﬁshing mortality indeﬁnitely without either becoming
extinct or being driven to the break-even stock level (the level at which further ﬁshing
becomes unproﬁtable).
However, when an agreement that includes all countries is ﬁnally reached, as in the
case of Scenario 1, the coastal state coalition will act as a sole owner, not as in Scenario 2
where Russia always acts as a singleton player while the coastal state coalition maximizes
its own proﬁt, taking the action of Russia as given. The sole owner payoﬀ being the
maximum attainable proﬁt, the agents in such a management agreement will never ﬁnd
themselves in a situation like Scenario 2, where the sum of the payoﬀs in a coalition
structure where some or all players act as singletons exceeds the payoﬀ to the coastal
state coalition. In the case of a low NAO index and less inﬂow of Atlantic water, Russia
is no longer regarded a coastal state; the coalition of coastal states is no longer stable even
if the coalition formation options were restricted to full cooperation among the coastal
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states, or they would revert to a state where all acts as singletons. In the opposite case of
high NAO index and increased inﬂow of Atlantic water, the coastal state coalition would
be stable if such a restriction were put on the coalition structure. However, if this is not
the case, the individual members of the coastal state coalition would have incentives to
free-ride on the agreement if the remaining coalition continued to cooperate. What has
become evident from our exercise is that if the Northeast Atlantic should cool down in
spite of global warming so that the distribution area of the blue whiting stock would be
reduced, the cooperation among the coastal states would become even more diﬃcult than
it is already and the blue whiting stock would almost certainly collapse.
4 Summary and Conclusions
This paper analysed how diﬀerent climate change scenarios might aﬀect the formation,
stability and success of the coastal state coalition on the management of the Northeast
Atlantic blue whiting ﬁsh stock. We assume that the blue whiting will change its
migration pattern and distribution area in response to changes in ocean temperature and
salinity. Two possible climate change scenarios were analyzed. First, an increased inﬂow
of relatively warm and saline Atlantic water into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents
Sea shifts the distribution of the blue whiting in a northeasterly direction with spawning
activity in Norwegian waters and blue whiting catches in Russian waters, making Russia
a member of the coastal state coalition. In the second scenario, less Atlantic water
ﬂows into the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, reducing the ocean temperatures and
salinities along the Norwegian coast as well as in the Barents Sea. In response to this,
the blue whiting would shift its distribution and spawning areas in a more south-western
direction, abandoning Russian waters altogether.
These two climate change scenarios are linked to the Northeast Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO) index. A high NAO index is associated with strong winds blowing in a
northeasterly direction across the Atlantic Ocean pushing warm and saline water into
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the Norwegian Sea and further northeast into the Barents Sea. A weaker NAO index, on
the other hand, means that the winds follow an east-west path across the Atlantic, and
that less of the warm and saline Atlantic water enters the Norwegian Sea and the Barents
Sea. Based on these scenarios, we formulated three possible combinations of quarterly
shares. Each share represents the fraction of the stock available for harvest in a certain
area, i.e., the diﬀerent exclusive economic zones or international waters, at certain times.
These shares, along with the model of Ekerhovd (2008), were used to calculate the payoﬀs
to coalitions under diﬀerent coalition structures.
Finally, this allowed us to analyse the coalition formation, success and stability, in
particular coalitions among the coastal states. The coalition analysis indicates that
the stability of the blue whiting agreement between the coastal states would remain
unchanged relative to today's agreement, cf. Ekerhovd (2008), if global warming means
an increase in sea temperatures in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. However,
if the opposite should happen, i.e., the inﬂow of Atlantic water into these waters is
reduced, and thus the distribution areas of the blue whiting stock is also reduced rather
than increased as a consequence of global warming, this would weaken the stability of
the current coastal state agreement on the management of the blue whiting stock.
Drastic changes in a ﬁsh stock's migration pattern might bring the underlying
weaknesses of a management regime into the open and the nations that harvest this stock
into conﬂict with each other (Hannesson, 2007). For instance, the coastal state agreement
on the management of the Norwegian Spring-spawning herring was suspended for two
years, 2003 and 2004 (Hannesson, 2006), when the stock failed to resume its expected
migration pattern, by spending the winter in Norwegian coastal waters rather than out
in the open Norwegian Sea. The Norwegian ﬁshermen, in particular, were not content
with their share of the catches as the stock spent most of its time within the Norwegian
EEZ. Another current potential conﬂict over a ﬁsh stock that has changed/expanded its
area of distribution is about the Northeast Atlantic mackerel, which has expanded its
migrations northwards, probably due to favourable climatic conditions, and is now found
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and ﬁshed in new areas in the international waters of the Norwegian Sea and within the
EEZ of Iceland. Iceland, not being a member of the mackerel management agreement,
has landed signiﬁcant amounts of mackerel during summer and autumn in 2007 and 2008.
This, in addition to the amounts landed by the member countries, has lead to a total
harvest in excess of ICES's recommendations.
In the ﬁrst climate change scenario, when the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea
were expected to warm up and the distribution of the blue whiting stock expected to
expand northeastward into the EEZ of Russia, the coastal state coalition would be stable
if the option of the member states to free-ride on the agreement for some reason did
not exist. Then the payoﬀ of the coastal state coalition would always exceed the sum of
payoﬀs to the coastal states acting as singletons, and the coastal states would be better oﬀ
cooperating in a coalition. However, when the coastal state coalition does not include all
the countries that participate in the ﬁshery, as is the case in the second scenario, and in
Ekerhovd (2008), Russia is excluded from participating in the coastal state coalition, the
coalition payoﬀ is less than a potential grand coalition payoﬀ would be, and a mechanism
that prohibits free-riding among the coastal states is not necessarily suﬃcient to make
the coastal state coalition stable. An example where this turns out to be true is Scenario
2 of this paper. What might help remedy this weakness is for the coastal states to
transfer some of their sovereignty over the ﬁsh stock staying in their national EEZs to
a regional ﬁsheries management organization (RFMO) and let it manage the ﬁsh stock.
According to the law of the sea, membership in a RFMO is open to all countries with
real interest in the ﬁsh stock (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003). The open membership of the
RFMOs guarantees a share of the proﬁts to all interested parties as well as being able to
provide a higher payoﬀ than any partial cooperation. Furthermore, if it is able to enforce
mechanisms that will deter its members from free riding, the prospects for cooperation
will be improved.
However, it is possible that this is partially achieved in the management of the
blue whiting stock. The coastal states agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) for the
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stock. This TAC is then divided among coastal states, and in addition a share thereof
is set aside to be harvested in international waters. The local RFMO, the North East
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), is given the responsibility of dividing this share
among all the interested parties, including Russia. Moreover, Russia could be further
accommodated by exchange of quota in their waters against being allowed to ﬁsh some of
the coastal states' shares in their respective EEZs. This can be seen as a way of sharing
the beneﬁts of cooperation through side-payments and, by providing higher beneﬁt than
a simple coastal state regime would be able to, a more stable management is achieved.
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Appendix
The annual spawning stock biomass is given by
SSBt =
10+∑
a=1
MOaWaNa,t, (A-1)
where the estimate of the maturity ogive deﬁnes the proportion of the mature individuals
in the age class as constant average, MOa, for each age class, Wa is the individual weight
in kilograms at age a , shown in Table (A-1), and Na,t is the number of individuals in age
group a in year t.
The numbers of ﬁsh at the beginning of a season that have survived last quarter's
harvest and avoided death by natural causes, are given as (dropping the year subscript
t)
Na,y =Na,y−1
{
SNEAFC,y−1e−[m/4+qa,y−1
P
iXi]
+
∑
i
Si,y−1e−[m/4+qa,y−1Xi]
}
,
(A-2)
where i = EU,FO, IS,NO,RU , and the catchability coeﬃcient, qa,y, shown in Table
(A-2), where a denotes the age group and y the ﬁshing season.
N1,1 = Rt (A-3)
Rt =

500, if SSBt−1 < Blim
α, if Blim ≤ SSBt−1 < Bpa
α+ β ×Rt−1, otherwise.
(A-4)
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Table A-1: Blue whiting: proportion of maturation, weight at age, and numbers at age
2000-2006.
Age Proportion Number of ﬁsh†
group mature Weight‡ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 0.11 0.049 39,743.1 62,497.4 45,631.2 48,220.4 33,551.6 24,040.7 1,141.0
2 0.40 0.075 16,963.6 30,681.3 47,661.7 35,374.2 33,551.6 25,544.5 18,435.0
3 0.82 0.102 16,123.1 11,916.0 21,291.1 33,737.2 25,251.3 25,948.5 18,369.9
4 0.86 0.125 12,150.7 9,579,3 6,932.3 12,869.4 2,069.6 14,962.8 15,955.9
5 0.91 0.147 3,813.6 6,318.9 4,784.9 3,602.6 6,808.6 10,467.8 7,862.8
6 0.94 0.168 909.8 1,985.9 3,153.4 2,463.2 1,835.3 3,252.9 5,220.1
7 1.00 0.185 435.0 409.8 875.3 1,427.3 1,141.5 761.2 1,440.2
8 1.00 0.200 207.4 196.0 180.6 396.2 661.6 473.5 337.0
9 1.00 0.222 138.7 93.4 86.4 81.8 183.6 274.4 209.6
10+ 1.00 0.254 384.3 235.6 145.0 104.7 86.4 112.0 171.1
†Numbers in millions
‡Weights in kilogram per individual
Table A-2: Blue Whiting: Quarterly age speciﬁc selectivity in catches
Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
First quarter 0.11 0.40 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Second quarter 0.11 0.40 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Third quarter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Fourth quarter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
The parameter values in Equation (A-4) are shown in Table (A-3).
The proﬁts earned by the diﬀerent national ﬂeets during a quarter of the year are as
follows (dropping the year subscript t)
pii,y =pXi
10+∑
a=1
qa,yNa,ywa
[
Si,y(1− e−[m/4+qa,yXi])
m/4 + qa,yXi
+
SNEAFC,y(1− e−[m/4+qa,y
P
iXi])
m/4 + qa,y
∑
iXi
]
− ciXi,
(A-5)
where i = EU,FO, IS,NO,RU , and ci denotes the countries cost parameters, shown in
Tables (A-4) and (A-5) for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, respectively.
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Table A-3: Recruitment function parameters for the blue whiting, estimated over the
period 1981-2006.
Parameters α β
Values 5113.57 0.76
Standard Errors 3790.41 0.14
R2adjusted 0.56
Durbin-Watson test statistic 1.51
Table A-4: Scenario 1: Cost parameters†
Scenario 1a
Costs
Coalition Structure X∞ CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 0.1301 6735 1953
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 0.104 5776
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 0.104 4416 3314
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 0.104 5609 2121
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 0.104 5178 2552
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 0.104 5223 2507
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0.0655 2387 2460 2054 3243 1894
Scenario 1b
Costs
Coalition Structure X∞ CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 0.1301 6735 2100
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 0.106 5540
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 0.106 4645 2995
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 0.106 5352 2288
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 0.106 4929 2711
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 0.106 5496 2144
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0.0688 2009 2585 2198 2872 2021
Scenario 1c
Costs
Coalition Structure X∞ CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 0.1301 6735 1684
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 0.113 5453
(EU,FO,IS,RU),(NO) 0.113 4989 2148
(EU,FO,NO,RU),(IS) 0.113 4989 2148
(EU,IS,NO,RU),(FO) 0.113 4989 2148
(FO,IS,NO,RU),(EU) 0.113 5437 1701
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0.0815 1584 2160 2160 2160 1627
†Values of NPV in million Norwegian kroner (NOK).
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Table A-5: Scenario 2: Cost parameters†
Scenario 2a
Costs
Coalition Structure X∞ CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 0.111 6071 1253
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 0.0945 6017 1961 1339
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 0.0945 5054 2925 1339
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 0.0945 5054 2925 1339
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 0.0945 5134 2845 1339
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0.077 2436 2588 2588 1737 1169
Scenario 2b
Costs
Coalition Structure X∞ CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 0.106 6107 1553
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 0.0895 5435 2136 1495
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 0.0895 4800 2772 1495
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 0.0895 4800 2772 1495
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 0.0895 4691 2881 1495
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0.077 2734 2706 2706 2043 1446
Scenario 2c
Costs
Coalition Structure X∞ CS EU FO IS NO RU
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 0.106 6107 1553
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 0.0895 4907 2665 1495
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 0.0895 4907 2665 1495
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 0.0895 4907 2665 1495
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 0.0895 5006 2566 1495
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0.0688 2444 1446
†Values of NPV in million Norwegian kroner (NOK).
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